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U.S. and Soviet Cooperatives
by Dr^; Mark A, Edelman **
Department of Economics
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» This pi uposal is designed tct -foster discussion among and
possible action by U.S. coopeiative entities concerning the
opportunities and risks of estabJ ishitig a joint venture with
Soviet cooperatives,
** Dr. Mark A- Edelman is an Associate Professor and Extension
Public Policy Economist in the Department of Econuniics. Iowa
State University. Edelman has conducted over 300 seminars on
various public policy topics including the agricultural economy^
agricultural policy^ and international trade. He also has
written over 130 columns for midwestern newspapers arid "farm media
on many of these issues. He recently participated in a seminar
exchange and food system study hosted by the U.S.S.R. Central
Council of Consumer Cooperatives (Centrosoyus) led by bhe 11.5.
National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (NCFOf Octobei*' 198S •
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THE aPPORIUNITY
-Significant Soviet political and economic restructuring is
occurring- Soviet leaders are making public admissions that the
command system of central planning instituted by Stalin is not
resulting in the standard of living desired by Soviet citizens
and perhaps more important, it has not generated economic growth
for sustaining a long—term global leadership position.
-Exchange missions to the U.S-S.R- confirm widespread use of
dated technologies, lack of quality control, major inefficiencies
in production and distribution, and lack of diversity in goods
and services for consumers due to bureaucratic management.
-As a resiilt, the U.S-S-R- is initiating many iiieasui es Lcr
deregulate their command economy. The initiatives are making
business relationships more compatible with western pi int-iples
and potentially profitable for joint ventures with western firms
These trends include placing limitations on government lule and
authority, decentralization of planning and resource allocation,
development of markets and competition, developing enteipi ises
that ai e autonomous from government, less government involvement
in state-owned enterprise management, and formation oF new cuops.
-This environment of deregulation represents a unique oppattiinity
Tor Soviet business entities with access to superioi managemenl
abilities, superior distribution concepts, superim marketing
abilities, and production technologies to establish national
networks that are more efficient and productive than the i ur i enl
USSR institutions that do not have access to these skills.
-The U-S.S.R- has invited western business interests tu establish
mutually beneficial joint ventures that would help them
their Bconprnic perforn,ancE. The Soviets
Soviet institutions in particular, would prefer to establish suuh
international joint ventures with cooperatives-
-These developments provide a unique and sigriificant potential
opportunity for U.S. cooperatives ^o develop a ma.o, market
presence in the U-S.S-R. and to. increase the returns to U.S.
farmer members. Only two'questions remain: Will U.S.
initiate efforts to seize the oppo. tunity? And ^
should such joint ventures take to assure a mutually beneficia
business relationship•
"This white paper presents one plan For consideration.
SHOULD IHE II-S. HELP THE U-S.B.M. IN IMPRDVINS THEIR FOOD SYSTEM?
Ihe current political and economic restructui ing will c.i eate
opportunities "for western business interests to indirectly access
national Soviet markets through joint ventures. This approach not
only has the potential to significantly improve the performance
of the Soviet economic system and allow perestroika to^ succeed,
but it also represents the potential to develop significant
economic relationships and returns for western inteiests, while
simultaneously improving the national security anvlronmant•
U.S. firms continue to adopt a wait and see attitude. Japan
and Western European business interests are currently
establishing Soviet market presence- If perestroika siiuceeris,
U.S. firms will enter Soviet markets late with disadvantage.
Second, if the performance of the Soviet food system is not
improved^ perestroika is more likely to fail- This could stall
the warming of U.S.-U.S.S.R. i elations and result in continued
high deficits and defense spending in the U-S- and Soviet Union-
There are two competing global security strategies- The
U.S. and U-S.S-R. can both continue down,the road of military
build-up. Or^ the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can both plan mutually
agreeable and Verifiable military reductions in armaments along
with building political linkages and economic interdependence-
This would reduce the need for high defense and deficit spending
in both nations*
U-S- assistance in helping Soviet peiestroika to succeed has
the potential of becoming an integral part of the latter global
strategy- It can become a major cornerstone for developing a more
secure political and economic world environment for the futui e.
SHOULD U.S. COOPERATIVES TAKE THE LEAD?
-Soviet leaders have placed heavy emphasis on cooperatives and
coop—type Ofganizations in their restructuring efforts. Othei
things being equal, Soviet political and cooperative ]Gade)s
prefer to develop international joint ventures with other
cooperatives. This creates a unique opportunity foi U.S. coops.
-Given the present lack of product diversity, product quality and
competitionp Soviet deregulation pi ovides a unique opportunity to
introduce new products and services into Soviet mar kets and to
build national distribution networks by selling franchise
packages to Soviet cooperatives. Such self-contained Franchise
networks could solve mariy of the bureaucratic problems that
plague the current Soviet economic system. As a result, the
potential returns to U.S. cooperatives and their members from a
U.S.^Soviet joint venture are very large and of global magnitude.
Soviet cooperative inatibutiDMB Itavfc' been given special emphasis
and more legal flexibility nndei peiestroike. Thus, U.S. Soviet
cooperative joint ventures may have more inherent potential For
profitability than joint ventures among noncpopei ativea-
I-F U.S. cooperatives develop a superior and favui ed system
for introducing U.S. products, management skills, and eqnipment
into the Soviet economyy there would be significant uppot tunities
to add additional U«S- joint venture partners that could make
the initial joint venture even more successful.
As a resuitf there is perhaps a once in a lifEtiwe
opportunity for U.S. cooperatives to dramatically enhance Vheir
economic and political stature at home and abroad.
WHAT TYPE OH U.S.-SOVIET CDDPERAl]VE JOINT VENTURE IS NEEDED?
IT MUST:
Have the capability to generate significant returns for U-S-
cooperative members.
— Have the capability to protect U.S. investment and pei sonnel
by possessing the appropriate Jegalp • financial and political
re1at i onsh i ps•
— Have the ability to leverage pilot enterprises and test
markets into national markets.
- Have the ability to attract significant Soviet capital and
managei ial talent.
Have the ability to uryanizfe efficient production,
distribution and retail netwui ks and train Soviet management
talent to deliver superior products and services.
- Have the initial ability tu attract UiS. coopeiatives williny
to make an initial capital commitment.
WOULD A NEW INTERREGIQNAl- COOPERAI IVE STRUCVURE MAKE SENSE?
The Soviet Union has a unique culture, political system,
legal structure and a unique set of business institutions. In
addition, the rules of the game are being revised. Therefore,
any potential U.S. cooperative considering a joint venture with
the U.S.S.R. would need to assemble a highly talented management
team with the stature and capabilities to accomplish three goals
critical to the success of the projects
—First, the / management team must have the capabilities to fully
understand Soviet history» language, culture, institutions,
rules, tastes, preferences and other factors that are influencing
the emerging Soviet markets, and market structures.
—Second,, in order to enhance profits and- limit potential losses,
the team must be able to provide thorough assessments of the
business opportunities and risks in the U-5.S.R. and negotiate
realistic plans given U»S- and Soviet market constrai.nts-
-Third, the -management team must b©- able Lo develop the
political, business .management, legal and financial skills and
relationships in the U.S- _and U-S.S-R-. necessary to assure the
greatest possible success of the pioject.
As a result, such a U.S.-Soviet joint venture must either be
initiated by an existing regional cooperative-with significant
internationai personnel and resources or by pooling the resources
of several regio.nal cooperatives to assemble a new interregional »
An interregional cooperative is more likely to develop the
economies of size to achieve the .maximum economic returns from
U-S-—Soviet joint ventures for U-5. cooperative members. The
knowledge gained and training resources assembled from setting up
initial, test-markets, pilot enterprises oj". franchise netwoi ks can
be used in establishing other test-markets, pilot enterprises and
franchise networks- An interregional cooperative would be inure
able to utilize the specialized xespurces from several coops. In
addition, the interregional coopeiative would be in a hetter
position to gain the experience required for success by observing
various pilot projects at the same time.
An interregional cooperative is more likely to develop the
financial clout, political statui and negotiating talent that
would make the U.S.-Soviet joint venture a success.. Tf • regional
cooperatives irtdiyidually develop their own joint ventures,, they
are less likely to multiply franchise networks in Soviet mai kets
and they are less likely to leverage the joint venture by adding
other potential U.S. cooperative and noncooperative partners.
An interregional cooperative would reduce the financial and
business risks for each regional cooperative partner. Regional
cooperatives presently provide a number of opportunities that
could potentially be, leveraged in the developing USSR markets.
However, some of the opportunities may be too risky for a single
cooperative. An interregional cooperative would spread the
financial, risks and could reduce the business risks by providing
the necessary expertise, resources, experience and i elationships
to develop such opportunities in U.S.5.R. markets.
Finally, an interregional cdpperati ve. woul d cstabH.sh a
single central focus for a new business entity that could
generate significant pubHc support and. good will tliat would iu
tui n generate private-and public financial resources.
WOULD A COOPERATIVELY CONTROLLEI) STUCK COMPANY MAKE SENSE?
Uhdei pereetroikap Soviet leaders are placing high emphasis
oh the cooperative form of business enterprise. As a resully
Soviet managers and enterprise leaders are more likely to prefer
to woi k with U.S. cooperativesy if ever/thing else .is equal.
In addition^ many of the new laws give preferencee and
flexibility for cooperatives. This implies that cooperative joint
ventures may likely be more profitable than noncooperative .loini
ventures. As a result^ several U.S. corporations are likely to
seek a relationship with U.S. cooperatives, if it is likely to
enhance their marketing oppor tfunities in the Soviet Union.
Adding corporations as partners may enhance the success uf a
U.S.~Sovifc?t joint venture^ if the particular corporations possess
special enterprise expertise desired by the Soviets or if the
corporations have strong ties and can provide access to Soviet
leaders required for a successful joint venture. Foi example^
regional cooperatives are not known for dominant expei fcise in
food processing machinery manufacturing, international
merchandising or retail franchising. Therefore^ if access to this
expertise was critical to the success of the U.S.-Soviet • joint
veritur e^ the interregional cooperative members could benefit by
forming a stock company and retaining majority control.
DOES A HOLDING COMPANY (UMBRELLA CONCEPT) MAKE SENSE?
Each member and partner uf the interregional is likely to
have proportionately more in1:erest in a specific eh1rerpr*isB or
set pf enterprises. The holding company approach would allow more
direct and equitable participation in management and retur ns by
those membei s and partners with disproportionate interest in
certain enterprises. At the same time^ a holding company assures
that the interests of all members and partners are protocteH by
managers oT each individual enterpr ise in the joint v&rrture.
The ability to vary the ownership and financing packagc pf
each subsidiary provides Flexibility in designing attractive
packages targeted to specific Soviet desires or in attracting new
potential U.S. cooperatives and nuncboperatives partners into the
interregional joint venture. This flexibility would not be
present in the traditional corporate pyramid structure.
WHAT WOULD HE THE MISSION OF THE COOP TRADING COMPANY?
To enter a joirit venture with Soviet cooperatives Tor the
purposes of fostering mutually beneficial commercial tiade^
building national franchise hetwoi ks and developing Soviet
markets -that would generate large returns foi U.S. cooperatives
and their Farmer members and would foster bettei U-Sr^-Soviet
relations for enhancirig global peace and economic stability.
WHAT WOULD THE US-USSR COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURE DO?
Interregional Cooperative
Stock Holding Company
United States
Provides
"Farm commodities and other U.S.
goods for export to the U.S.S.R..
-Provides materials and expertise
' to build new plants and equipment
-New products Tor teat-marketing
in the Soviet Union and eventual
licensing for production in
'the U.S.S.R.
'Management expertise for tiaining
potential ft anchise managers and
developing production^ mar^keting
and distr ibutioii rietwoi ks bo'
service the franchises developed.
^Technologies that are new -to the
USSR that would improve the
quantity^ quality and diversity
of U.S.S.R. consumer goods.
Centi osoyuz
Affiliates
Soviet Union
Provides
-Fertilizer and other goods
for export to the U.Sv
-Provides capita] investors
to buy plants and equipment.
''Pilots several, test markets
and identifies local coops
for prospective licensees to
produce successful pioducts.
'-Identifies local coops with
capital and potential talent
for prospective franchieee
investors.
'-Undeveloped markets^, labor
intensive tcchnologleSy and
management 'Urifami liar with
competition.
HOW MIGHT THE U.3. INTERREGTONftL TRADING COMPANY BE STRUCTURED?
A tentatis'e initial structure has been developeci for pin puses
of conducting a feasibility analysis. Such a structure might
look something like the one described below.
JOINT VENTURE
U.S. COOPERATIVE BOARD
> cooperative members
< ^9% private stockholders
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Engi neer ing^
Construction
Marketing
Distributiut
SUBSIDIARY 1
C-'Stores
SUBSIDIARY P.
Dairy Foods
7
Training^
Qm Control
U.S.S.R. PAR1NER
Legaly
Poli ti cal
SUBSIDIARY 3
f'ruit/Vegetable
SUBSIDIARY 4
Grain Foods
WHAT ARE 1IIE STEPS IN SETTING UP SUCH A VENTURE?
For discussion purposes^ a fuui pihase pl.firi is described
be]oM. We might initially expecb the plan.to involve a four-
year cyclen Each phase WDul'd lasb about one year* Mciwevei y the
length of each phase depends upon the progress-made. The cycle
concept is importanb because additional cycles can be initiated
when additional partners are attracted to the .ioint venture.
PHASE I- PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PHASE
!• Inform and revise the ,ioint venture proposal baaed on
discussions with leaders of major U.S. coopei atives and utheis.
Make formal presentations directly to boards and perhaps at the
19B9 AIC-NICE Conference- Acquire letters of intent-
5. Facilitate the appropi ate US-USSR exchange rnissions to foslei
a refining of joint venture concepts as needed. Perhaps a major
presentation could be made at the NCFC/AIC-CENTROSOYUS sponsoi ed
symposium scheduled for Moscow in October, 1969.
3. Identify the potential enterprises, products, and pilot
packages that are of interest to the Soviets- Determine which
ones ate doable by U.S. cooperatives.
'i. Begin to identify the available coorierative, nuncoopei alive,
and public resources for establishing such a joint venluie-
Inform and seek the support of the highe&t political leaders.
5- Develop plant and equipment designs and formulate a business
plan to initiate the joint venture.
6. Investigate the potential joint venture partner's identified-
IF acceptable terms are negotiated, charter the new intei i egional
and sign the US—USSR joint venture-
PHASE Jl. pilot CONSTRUCTION PHASE.
To identify markets, build pilot plants and install einuipment-
PHASE III- FRANCHISE PACKAGE DEVELOPMENT PHASE-
To test, develop, and begin to mai ket franchise packages.
PHASE IV,_ HFRANCHISE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PHASE.
To train franchisees and build national fr^anchise networks.
WHAT ARE THE FINANCIAL REQUlRfc'MEIiTS?
Each U-S-" interi egional fi&rtiiKr might be eKpected to , invest
*3 to *5 million toward each pilot enterprise to cover the fiist
four phases of the project. The Soviet cooperatives would be
required to match an equivalent amountp In ordei to achicvts
initial economies of size^ a minimum of four pilot enterprises
would be required but more- would be desirable- For* discussion
purposes, the initial 50-50 joint venture partnership would have
capital of $5^ ,to $^0 million.
Each partner, U-S. and Soviet, would have to pruvitiE-
satisfactory proof of commitment to the other par tners before
the venture could proceed. Most of the capital would not be
requir ed until the constr uctiun^ test—mar keting and franctiise
marketing occurs in Phase II, HI and IV.
I
Acitess to 61 to «S million wuuld likely be required to
complete the Phase I studies that detei mine whether such a ioint
venture is feasible, to determine which pilot enterprises provide
the best opportunities, and to negotiate an acceptible joint
venture agreement. Such up-front costs might be shared equally
by the potential interregional partners. However, future
partners would likely, be charged a partnership entry fee
reflecting the added value of the company at a future time-
To initiate the effort, four potential regional cooperative
partners might contribute $100,000 to begin initial discussions-
Additional funds could be pledged if satisfactory progress is
made. Thus, the study may discontinued at any time v<5thuut
risking an inordinate amount of seed money.
In addition, it may be possible to partially fund some of
the initial work from contributions by other public and private
Funding groups that have a- strung interest in . economic
development, world peace, and/or managment training.
Some of the Initial wot k on ttie study might logically be
coordinated by a disinterested outside consultant. A nnivGrsity
consultant may also help to shape a partnership proposal that
could become more acceptable to other future potential partnei s
and attract funds that would not uther;wise be available to the
project. Such work would , naturally be-, conductcd under the
direction and guidance of' a board committee of the furtders.
WHAT ARE HIE OVERALL BENEFITS OF A IKS.-SOVIET JOINT VtNTURt?
]. Increased access to Soviet niai kels us tliey »i e developed.
5- Shared joint venture earnings from U.S. and Soviet eKports of
godds and services, facility construction and equipment sales,
initial Franchise fees, annual Tranchise fees, Teee fi uni Soviet
product and service manufacturing licensee.
3. Increased political and economic statui e at hooie and abi oadp
if a highly visible development was to be succesHful- The global
security implications of a succBBsrul effort are phenomenaK
ViHAT ARE THE RISKS?
Risk of changes in the poiiiical environment.
a. Risks of joint venture agreement non performance-
3. Currency exchange problems^
V
'I. Bartei and payment risks-
5. Risks that western products, marketSp manayement ski 1Is,
quality control techniques cannot work or will not be accepted
in Soviet society.
It should be noted that iiisurancB and governiiiEnt guai anleea
can be used to reduce oi Hniit the economic impacts on U_.w.
rirms for many oF these risks. The development oF ="l'erior
-intelligence dapabilitiea, rigorous payment procedui es and tougii
negotiations on the design oF a .joint ventuie agt eeinent can
incorpoiate checks and balances that would alert manageniGnl lo
problems as soon as they develop. This could limit the euouoniic
impacts on U.S. firms before additional investments ai c mdde.
It should also be noted that a numbei oF .joint venture
agreements have been signed with the USSR. However, only, a
relative Few are underway. Some of the remaining ventures will
not progress until the potential gains improve and Jhe new
pereatroika rules are more clear. However, in each
with a joint venture agreement a. e in an advantageous
compared to those who don't as the new rules and ncentives under
perestroika are refined and clarified further during the next Few
years.
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